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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Following 
Issuers, their Securities, 
Affiliates or Successors, 
and/or Entities subsequently 
organized by them, including 
H & B Carriers, Inc., et al., 
Capital General Corporation, 
Petitioners/Appellants 
vs 
Utah Securities Division, and the 
Department of Business Regulation, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI 
Docket No, 
Ct of App No. 910196-CA 
Priority No. 13. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF FINAL DECISION OF THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Appellant, by and through counsel, pursuant to Rules 43 and 
46, Rules of Appellate Procedure, files this Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Petitioners present three issues for review: 
1. Assuming a violation of the provisions of the Utah 
Securities Act in the sale of securities to the public without 
registration, do the statutory remedies granted to the Utah 
Securities Division include thereafter taking from the then owners 
of the securities all transactional exemptions granted to them by 
Section 61-1-14(2), U.C.A. (1953, as amended), so that they can 
never sell their securities, even though a statutory exemption 
from registration may be applicable? 
Although such action of the Division was upheld by the Court 
of Appeals, not only is there no authorization for such in 
the provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, but to the 
contrary the remedy/penalty provisions of the Act are 
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directed only at punishing violators and not the current 
security holders who may have purchased from an illegal 
seller. It is true that the suspension order does not 
specifically name the many individual security holders, but 
the effect of suspending all transactional exemptions 
nevertheless effectively prevents anyone from using them, 
now or at any time in the future. 
2. Does Section 61-1-7, U.C.A. (1953, as amended) which 
prohibits the sale of securities without registration also 
prohibit gifts of securities without registration, especially in 
light of the case of Andrews v. Chase, 49 P.2d 938 (Utah 1935)? 
The Court of Appeals has answered "yes" to this question 
notwithstanding (1) the plain meaning of the words gift and 
sale, and (2) the case of Andrews v. Chase, a case on all 
fours with this case as to the specific issue, in which this 
Court held that the statute prohibiting sales of securities 
without registration specifically did not prohibit gifts. 
3. Was the affirmation by the Court of Appeals of the 
imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a significant departure from the usual and accepted 
course of judicial proceedings in light of Appellant's arguments 
that the Andrews case is controlling, that there is no authority 
in the Utah Code for the action taken by the Appellee in issuing 
and upholding the suspension order, and Appellant's other 
arguments? 
At least three valid reasons, as will be discussed below, show 
that the Appellant's arguments in the District Court were 
warranted by existing law and were not interposed for any 
improper purpose. For the Court of Appeals to rubber stamp 
the sanctions imposed by the District Court is an improper 
deviation from the usual and accepted course of judicial 
proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Review is sought of a February 10, 1992 decision rendered by 
the Utah Court of Appeals. A Petition for Rehearing was filed on 
February 24, 1992. The Court of Appeals denied the petition on 
March 9, 1992. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review 
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March 9, 1992. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review 
this matter by a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Section 78-2-
2(5), Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Appellant believes the following statutes and rules to be 
controlling in this matter. However, due to their length, they 
will be printed as part of the addendum (All statutory references 
are to the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)): 
Section 61-1-7 Section 61-1-13(15)(c)(ii) 
Section 61-1-14(2) Section 61-1-20 
Section 61-1-14(3) Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant requests the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari for 
the purpose of reviewing the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
upholding the order of the Utah Securities Division suspending all 
Section 61-1-14(2), U.C.A. transactional exemptions applicable, or 
which at any time thereafter may become applicable, to trades by 
the securities holders of H & B Carriers, Inc., its affiliates and 
successors, and 46 other corporations. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On December 1, 1987 the Utah Securities Division brought a 
petition pursuant to the Utah Uniform Securities Act, 61-1-14(3), 
U.C.A. to suspend all Section 61-1-14(2) transactional exemptions 
applicable, or which at any time thereafter may become applicable, 
as to the securities of H & B Carriers, Inc. and 46 other Utah 
corporations because the securities had been gifted to members of 
the public without prior registration. The agency asserted that 
such gifts violated the registration provisions of the Utah 
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An order of suspension was issued on December 1, 1987 with 
respect to the securities of these companies. Appellant Capital 
General Corporation as an interested party, being the party who 
made the gifts of stock, requested that the matter be set for 
hearing. Hearing was held on January 20, 1988 at which time 
evidence and testimony was offered and received (R. at 8). 
An Administrative Law Judge affirmed the December 1, 1987 
suspension order on April 15, 1988. The Executive Director of the 
Department of Business Regulations approved the affirmation on 
April 27, 1988. The Securities Advisory Board approved the 
affirmation on April 26, 1988 (R. at 8-14). Thereafter, Appellant 
filed a timely petition for review in the Third District Court for 
Salt Lake County (Petition for Review, R. at 2-5). 
Thereafter, but prior to action being taken by the District 
Court, a related case was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals 
which affirmed a suspension order in a prior but related case, 
Capital General Corp. v. Utah Department of Business Regulations. 
777 P.2d 494 (Utah Ct. App, 1989), cert denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 
1989), (hereinafter referred to as "Amenity", the name of the 
company whose securities trading exemptions were at issue in that 
case). 
The District Court upheld the Final Order of the Appellee on 
September 10, 1990 (R. at 101-107). A Motion for New Trial was 
filed on September 20, 1990 (R. at 113-114) and that motion was 
denied on November 20, 1990 (R. at 134-136). Notice of Appeal was 
filed on December 10, 1990 (R. at 156-157). The Utah Court of 
Appeals affirmed the Securities Advisory Board on February 10, 
1992. A Petition for Rehearing was denied on March 9, 1992. 
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C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant Capital General Corporation, at various times in and 
prior to 1986, with others, incorporated the 47 corporations at 
issue In 1986 Appellant made gifts of the stock of these 
corporations to various individuals with whom Capital General had 
been associated. (R. at 8). None of the securities which were 
given away were registered with the Utah Securities Division, nor 
was registration sought. Further, no exemptions from registration 
requirements were sought or issued with respect to the gifting of 
those securities (R. at 8-9). 
Prior to making the gifts of stock, the president of Capital 
General inquired of the Utah Securities Division as to whether 
gifts of stock were exempt from registration. He also checked 
with the Securities Division of the State of Nevada in addition to 
obtaining various legal opinions. He was always advised that 
gifts of stock need not be registered since such was required only 
for sales of stock. (Evidence file, Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing 
at 66-76). 
Capital General relied on this advice and didn't register the 
stock but made the intended gifts to many individuals with whom 
the company had dealt. No consideration was ever received or 
expected in exchange for the gifts of stock. The gifts were made 
without any obligation on the part of the recipients (Evidence 
file, Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at 66-76). 
The President of Capital General also testified at the initial 
hearing in January 1988 that he had received "no-action" letters 
from eleven different states, which indicated that there were no 
rules against gifting unregistered stock in those states. 
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(Evidence file, Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at 76). 
Based upon all of these investigations, Capital General was 
confident that no registration requirements would be violated in 
making the gifts, (Evidence file, Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at 
70-71). However, the Utah Securities Division later took the 
position that the gifts were sales in violation of Section 61-1-
7, U.C.A. and suspended all trading exemptions that were currently 
applicable or that forever after may become applicable. The order 
effectively and perpetually stopped all further trading of the 
stock of these companies, whether or not statutorily defined 
exemptions were applicable or ever would become applicable. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS HAS IGNORED THE CLEAR MEANING OF A STATUTE AND THUS 
SANCTIONED AN INVALID USE OF A STATUTE 
The Court of Appeals upheld the suspension order of the 
Appellee. In this case, as well as in the Amenity decision, the 
lower courts appear to have totally misunderstood the difficulty 
presented by what the Utah Securities Division has done in 
suspending all transactional exemptions in the securities of the 
47 companies. The scope of the suspension order goes far beyond 
the statutory authority given the Division and clearly is not a 
proper remedy for a violation of Section 61-1-7, as claimed. 
It is critical that the Court understand the regulatory scheme 
of the Securities Act. Section 7 prohibits sales of securities 
unless they are registered or exempt from registration. Section 
14(2) lists 17 transactional exemptions, that is, 17 specific 
transactions that are exempt from registration, for example, a 
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sale that does not involve offering to the public. By examining 
said 17 exempt transactions (subparagraphs (a) - (q) of Section 
61-1-14(2)) it is clear that the legislative intent was to exempt 
them for the reason that the public did not need the protection 
afforded by registration in such situations. 
Appellee found Appellant to have sold securities to the public 
without registration or exemption and therefore to have violated 
Section 7. Although this is contested, let us assume arguendo 
that such was the case, that is, in 1986 Appellant sold 
unregistered securities in the 47 companies to members of the 
public in violation of Section 7. Having learned of this 
violation, the Utah Securities Division suspended all applicable 
Section 14(2) transactional exemptions, or those which may at any 
time in the future become applicable, respecting the securities of 
those companies. The effect of this is that if you happened to be 
one who purchased the illegally sold stock, the Division's order 
stops you from ever reselling it to anyone else, even if one or 
more of the 17 exempted situations apply or later becomes 
applicable. There is nothing in Section 14 or anywhere in the 
Securities Act to indicate that the legislature could possibly 
have intended such a bizarre result. Whether stock was sold 
illegally in the first instance should have nothing to do with the 
rights of current stock holders to avail themselves of statutorily 
granted exemptions, particularly when it is obvious that the types 
of transactions described in Section 14(2) were carved out as 
exemptions from registration because registration would serve no 
useful purpose. 
Nevertheless, Appellee claimed authority for its suspension 
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order in Section 14(3), which section does indeed grant the 
Division power to "deny" or "revoke" any of said 17 exemptions 
following notice and a hearing. The crucial questions that emerge 
are: Under what circumstances does it have power to do that? 
What are the criterion? Obviously the legislature did not intend 
for the Division to have power to revoke or deny exemptions at its 
pleasure, without any criteria, or it would not have required 
notice and a hearing. 
The applicable section, Section 61-1-14(3), unfortunately does 
not list any criteria. As a result one must obtain this 
information by considering all of the relevant sections of the Act 
as they interact with each other in the regulation of securities. 
Since a hearing is required, it is clear that certain findings 
must be made at the hearing before any power can be invoked. 
Appellant's position is that in order to "revoke" or "deny" an 
exemption, that finding must establish a violation of Section 14 
by the person seeking the exemption and with respect to the 
particular exemption sought. Nothing in the? statute allows a 
blanket suspension of all exemptions, those which may become 
applicable in the future, nor especially prevention of parties who 
have had nothing to do with any violations from utilizing 
applicable exemptions. 
There are five reasons, from the provisions of the Act, that 
conclusively establish Appellant's said position: 
1. There is nothing in Section 14(3) that states or suggests 
that it was designed to be as all encompassing and far reaching as 
to allow a suspension of all exemptions, based on a violation of a 
different section of the Act (by different parties even!). 
9 
2. One might well ask why the drafters of Section 14(3) would 
set up the hearing requirement and not list the criteria. A 
reading of the entire Section 14 would suggest that it was most 
probably because they assumed the reader would naturally 
understand that the remedy portion of the section, i.e. 
subparagraph (3), had direct relation to and was dependent upon 
the substantive portions, i.e., the descriptions of the available 
exemptions in subparagraphs (1) and (2). In other words, the 
statutory scheme of the drafters was that if someone is 
erroneously claiming a particular one of the 17 exemptions, the 
way to find out is to set up a hearing and deny it if the error is 
established at the hearing. Nowhere in Section 14 or elsewhere in 
the Act is there language to imply or suggest anything beyond 
that. 
3. That the remedy of Section 14(3) is limited to Section 14 
applications is further established by the wording of Section 7, 
the section claimed to have been violated by Appellant. Under 
Section 7, securities can be legally sold only if they are 
registered or the transaction is exempt, i.e., if the transaction 
is one of those described in Section 14(2)(a) through (q), 
mentioned above. The either/or posture of Section 7 makes it 
clear that the Section 14 exemptions apply only to unregistered 
stock. Yet the opinion of the Court of Appeals amounts to just 
the opposite, i.e., the Court has in effect stated that the 
exemptions of Section 14 that may otherwise be applicable must be 
suspended because this stock is in the hands of the public in an 
unregistered condition. Again, it is seen in the specific wording 
of the 17 exempted types of transactions that the very purpose of 
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Section 14 and the exemptions is to allow people with unregistered 
stock, regardless of how they obtained it (but assuming for the 
sake of argument that they are innocent, as at least 99% of the 
stockholders in the present matter certainly are), to dispose of 
it under the circumstances there described. And these 
circumstances are those in which the legislature has deemed that 
the benefits of registration are not needed. It appears that the 
Court of Appeals may be of the opinion that because the several 
hundred stockholders received their unregistered stock in 
transactions in which the Appellant violated Section 7, that 
somehow that has tainted the securities for all time, and that is 
why it is justifiable to allow the blanket suspension. If so, 
this is an unsupported supposition inasmuch as no provision 
anywhere in the Act, states, suggests or implies anything close to 
such a concept. In fact the specific circumstances described in 
the 17 described exempted transactions are greatly in conflict 
with such a concept, i.e., in every exempted circumstance 
described, the basis for the exemption involves only the issues of 
protection to the new purchaser and not whether some prior 
purchaser in the chain had bought it without the benefit of 
registration or other exemption.* 
1Section 14(2)(j)(ii) may at first glance appear to be an 
exception to this since it specifically restricts the application 
of the (j) exemption if the existing security holders acquired 
their shares in a transaction in violation of Section 7. Not so, 
however, because the restriction applies only to a new issue by the 
issuer and not to resale by the security holders. Nevertheless, 
this provision is highly significant in the present discussion 
because it corroborates completely Appellant's position above, to-
wit: Since it specifies a particular fact situation that would 
defeat that particular exemption, it follows that the same fact 
situation is not the criteria that would defeat the other 17 
exemptions. That specific fact situation is also the one found by 
the Division in the present case, i.e., that securities were 
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The logic of this is very compelling. After all, what does 
the fact that John Doe may have been duped into purchasing an 
unregistered or unexempted security have to do with whether he 
should be allowed to sell it sometime in the future provided that 
he complies with the law. 
4. It is significant to note that Section 14(3) grants power 
to "deny" or "revoke11 any exemption, but does not grant power to 
"suspend." Nor does it grant this power with respect to "any and 
all exemptions," but only with respect to "any exemption." 
Granted, it can be argued, within the meaning of proper word 
usage, that if one is given power to act with respect to "any" he 
can add up all the "anys" so that he can act with respect to 
"all." However, when all three words in the provision are 
considered together, it is clear what the legislature had in mind, 
and it was not a blanket suspension of all. The word "deny" is 
commonly used in response to a request. "Revoke" is to cancel 
something that has already been effectuated. It seems that the 
Division must have realized this when it issued its order and 
therefore did not use the statutory language of "deny" (because 
nothing had been requested) or "revoke" (because no one had 
attempted to use any of the 17 exemptions so that such could be 
revoked), and instead just went ahead and issued a blanket 
suspension to be effective forever in the future (which power is 
received in a transaction in violation of Section 7. Thus, by the 
wording of the statute itself, we see that a finding of a Section 7 
violation in the distribution of the stock cannot itself be used as 
the criteria for denying or revoking an exemption. And with that 
falls the Appellee's whole case, as the finding that the Appellant 
made the illegal distribution is not relevant to the Section 14 
exemptions unless under (j), Appellant were to attempt to make a 
like distribution to the same shareholders, and in that event, the 
(j) exemption could legitimately be denied following a hearing. 
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not authorized in the statutory language). Thus, it is seen why 
the drafters used "any" instead of "any and all" or "all," as it 
was contemplated that an individual seeking the benefits of 
Section 14 exemptions certainly wouldnft attempt to rely on all 17 
(because the factual circumstances described in each are too 
dissimilar) and that a revocation or denial hearing pursuant to 
14(3) would necessarily be specific as to the particular exemption 
claimed. 
5. In the paragraphs above, Appellant has given a number of 
reasons based on the specific applicable statutory language in 
support of its position. These are all bolstered by the fact that 
acceptance of Appellant's position does not leave the Division 
without adequate remedy. Sections 20 and 21 grant authority to 
the Division to bring about very severe penalties for selling 
stock without registration or exemption, including such things as 
rescission, fines, disgorgement of profits, injunctions and 
criminal penalties. How could it be more clear that this is the 
way the legislature intended that violations of the Act, such as 
sales in violation of Section 7, would be punished? Somebody 
makes an illegal sale - so maybe they'll have to disgorge the 
profits or have it rescinded, etc. It makes a lot of sense. 
Sections 20 and 21 start out with words to the effect that these 
are the remedies the Division has for "a violation of this 
chapter." The legislature's specifying such in these sections but 
not in Section 14(3) sends a clear message that such was not 
intended to apply to 14(3) also. 
In the companion case, Amenity, the Court of Appeals appeared 
to recognize the correctness of Appellant's above argument with 
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respect to why Section 14(3) doesn't give the necessary authority, 
but the Court concluded that it was harmless error for the 
Division to have proceeded under Section 14 instead of Section 20. 
Appellant would have no problem with the harmless error argument 
if Section 20 granted authority for the blanket/forever 
suspension, i.e., Appellant would not seek to take advantage of a 
mere technicality of the Division inadvertently proceeding under 
the wrong section. However, the problem is that there is no 
language in Section 20 to empower the Division to order the 
blanket/forever suspension either. 
The Court of Appeals attempts to justify its ruling that 
Section 20 provides enabling power by pointing out that Section 20 
provides that when someone has violated the Act, the Division is 
empowered to either issue a show cause order to cease and desist 
or seek a district court injunction. It is respectfully submitted 
that this constitutes power to order that the violation stop, and 
nothing more. It is simple: If a person has violated the Act 
(e.g., selling unregistered securities to members of the public), 
then this provision quoted by the Court empowers the Division to 
enjoin further violations in a court action, or enter its own 
cease and desist order with respect to such. That's all. It 
authorizes nothing more. It says nothing about any power to 
suspend trading of the stock already purchased or received by the 
stockholders, i.e., the victims of the Section 7 violator's 
illegal sales. And as alluded to above in the discussions under 
Section 14, no valid reason exists for such, i.e., the statutory 
scheme throughout is aimed at stopping or punishing the violator 
and helping the victim. It is hard to imagine how the legislature 
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could have more clearly spelled out that Section 20 remedies are 
aimed solely at the perpetrator and have no affect whatsoever on 
securities after the illegal seller has sold to the victims. It 
goes against all logic and accepted rules of English usage to 
conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that because the Division 
has power to order the Section 7 violator to cease making illegal 
sales, it therefore has power to issue an eternal and all reaching 
suspension order preventing victims of prior illegal sales (and 
other stockholders who were not victims) from utilizing Section 14 
exemptions with respect to their stock. 
Point Two 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE 
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN CONFLICT A PRIOR DECISION 
OF THIS COURT, NAMELY ANDREWS V, CHASE, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 
(1935). 
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the Appellee that 
the Appellant's gifts of stock were in fact sales, and hence were 
in violation of the registration requirements of Section 61-1-7. 
Although no one questioned that the transfers of stock without 
consideration were in fact gifts in the normal sense and usage of 
the word, the lower court has nevertheless ruled them to be sales 
on the theory that by making the gifts Appellant put itself in a 
better position to realize subsequent value from the corporation 
because of thereafter having a public company. In doing so, it 
ignored the case of Andrews v. Chase, 49 P.2d 938 (Utah 1935), the 
holding of which is controlling on this issue. 
Andrews involved the exact same question as this case on the 
gift/sale issue. In that case, as here, stock was gifted to 
members of the public, and it was claimed that such gifts violated 
the securities act then in effect. That act was basically 
identical to the present act in that it prohibited sales of 
securities without registration (and also defined sale as a 
disposition for value). The Supreme Court rejected the claim that 
the gifts were sales and held there was no violation of the Act 
even though it was pointed out that the gifted stock in that case 
was assessable stock which amounted to a direct value to be 
received from the giftees if they paid their subsequently levied 
assessments. The Court followed time honored principles of 
statutory construction and held: 
The stock here involved is not one of the kinds of 
securities which are exempt from the provisions of the 
Securities Act. Appellant does not contend otherwise. What 
he does contend is that the Act merely regulates the sale of 
securities and has no application whatever to securities which 
are given away. It will be observed that "sale or sell" is 
defined as every disposition for value. The words "for value" 
are descriptive of, and constitute a limitation on, the kind 
of transactions which the Securities Act was intended to 
regulate. It is a cardinal rule of the construction of a 
statute that, when possible, effect must be given to all the 
language the legislature used in the Act. If the legislature 
had intended the words "sale or sell" should include "gift or 
give," it would not have limited the former words to such 
dispositions, or attempted disposals of securities as are made 
for value... Had the law making power intended that the Act 
should apply to gifts or securities, it would have been a 
simple matter to have so provided. 
49 P.2d at 941 (Emphasis added). 
Appellant submits that that language and holding of Andrews 
have never been overruled. It is still valid and should remain 
such. It applies directly to and is controlling in this case. 
The Court of Appeals1 opinion does not respond specifically to 
Appellant's arguments that Andrews is controlling, but relies on 
its holding in the companion case, Amenity, (which does attempt to 
distinguish Andrews and give reasons for not following it) in 
holding that Appellant's gifts of stock were in reality sales and 
therefore prohibited by the Act. In attempting to distinguish 
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Andrews, the Court of Appeals states that its most "compelling" 
reason for not following it is that it claims that it was 
overruled by the legislature by the subsequent enactment of 
Section 61-l-15(c)(ii), stating, "a purported gift of assessable 
stock is an offer or sale..," Amenity at 497, footnote 3. 
Granted, it is obvious that the quoted section was enacted to 
overrule the result in Andrews should someone again attempt to 
obtain funds from the public from assessments of assessable stock 
he had gifted to them. Obviously the legislature didn't want 
stock to be given away with those kinds of strings attached, i.e., 
the giftees having to pay the assessments or lose the gift (which 
is tantamount to a "sale" though not really a sale without the 
subsequent additional language in the statute). 
However, it doesn't follow that the subsequently enacted 
language was intended to, or in fact did, overrule any other part 
of Andrews. Rather, this language shows that the holding of the 
case and the sound basis on which the case was decided - that 
words in a statute mean what they say, that a gift really isn't a 
sale without a specific statutory declaration that it is - has 
been left totally intact inasmuch as the new language was limited 
only to "purported gifts of assessable stock." Andrews remains 
fully applicable for all other kinds of gifts. And it should also 
be pointed out that not only were Capital General's gifts not of 
assessable stock, but they were real and bona fide gifts and not 
"purported" ones. 
Further, Appellant is concerned with the Court of Appeals' 
reasoning at the end of its discussion where it attempts to 
distinguish the facts of Andrews on a present benefit vs. hope of 
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future benefit theory. The Court claims that the assessable stock 
situation is only a hope in the future, whereas in the present 
case, the gifts create an immediate and certain benefit to the 
giver. In the first place, on the particular point raised the 
facts are not distinguishable as claimed, that is, in both cases 
the gifts were made to large numbers of the public thereby 
creating public companies. There really is no difference between 
the two cases on this point. Second, the premise is wrong, i.e., 
the claimed "immediate actual benefit" of a public company is in 
reality only a potential for benefit, as everyone in the 
securities business knows, and in fact, the likelihood of payment 
of assessments from the owners of the assessable shares would 
probably be a greater likelihood. 
And finally, though the cases are not distinguishable on the 
point mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion, they are 
distinguishable in that the benefit flows directly from the 
giftees in the Andrews case, whereas the potential benefits in the 
situation in the present case become reality only upon the further 
efforts of the givers (infusion of assets, work to make the 
company viable, etc.). In other words, the only truly 
distinguishing feature between Andrews and the present case would 
have the exact opposite affect to what was opined by the Court of 
Appeals, i.e., the gift in which the giftee has to pay something 
to retain it (assessable stock) more closely resembles an actual 
sale rather that the other way around (non assessable stock). But 
despite the close resemblance in Andrews between a gift of 
assessable stock and a sale, since the legislature had not 
required the registration of gifts, the Utah Supreme Court wisely 
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and judiciously refused to read words into the legislative 
enactment. 
The Court of Appeals erred in going beyond the meaning of the 
plain words of the statute and by ignoring the holding of Andrews. 
For this reason, this Court should grant the petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari. 
POINT THREE 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE ISSUED BECAUSE BY UPHOLDING 
THE SANCTIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT, THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED 
THE STANDARDS REQUIRED BY RULE 11, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The Appellant had at least three good reasons for continuing 
its appeal from the final order of the Utah Securities Division, 
despite the outcome of the Amenity decision. 
First, the Appellant believed that the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Andrews decision was 
no longer valid. It was entirely proper to continue the appeal in 
light of the argument that Andrews controls in this case. 
Appellant had and has no other options than to convince this Court 
to issue a Writ of Certiorari to declare that its decision in 
Andrews is still valid law. 
Second, relative to the issue of the statutory authority of 
the Appellee to issue the suspension order, in Amenity, the Court 
of Appeals indicated that even if Appellant is correct in stating 
that Section 61-1-14(3) does not give the Utah Securities Division 
authority for the suspension, Section 61-1-20 does. This was the 
first time anywhere that it was suggested that Section 61-1-20 
gave authority to the Appellee to suspend Section 61-1-14(2) 
transactional exemptions. However, as discussed in Point One 
above, this is not a correct conclusion. Hence, in this case, at 
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the District Court level, Appellant had its first opportunity to 
argue that neither section gives the necessary statutory authority 
sought. Amenity was decided after this appeal in the District 
Court was initiated, but before the ruling of the District Court 
Judge. Appellantfs argument was well grounded in fact and 
warranted by existing law, and at worst was a good faith argument 
for modification of existing interpretation of the law in light of 
Amenity. 
Finally, Appellant argued that the gifts of stock were good 
faith gifts and introduced evidence at the January 20, 1988 
hearing. The Order of the Appellee in effect concluded, however, 
that if the magnitude of the gift is significant enough to create 
a public company by virtue of gifts of unregistered stock, then 
the gifts per se cannot qualify as a "good faith gifts" regardless 
of actual good faith and thus are subject to registration. (Record 
at page 13). However, if this happens, then the clear meaning of 
the words "good faith gift" in the statute is lost and the 
question of whether or not a gift of stock was made in good faith 
takes on a meaning that has nothing to do with what the statute 
says or what people commonly understand and accept good faith to 
mean. 
Appellant sought to have the District Court review this issue, 
particularly in light of evidence, to establish Appellant's good 
faith in making the gifts. For example, before making the gifts of 
stock, the Appellant's president inquired of the Utah Securities 
Division as to whether gifts of stock were exempt from 
registration. He also checked with the Securities Division of the 
State of Nevada in addition to obtaining various legal opinions. 
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He was consistently advised that gifts of stock need not be 
registered. He even received "no-action" letters from 11 
different states indicating that gifted stock need not be 
registered. (Evidence file, Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at 66-
76). Appellant relied on this advice and didn't register the 
stock but made the intended gifts. The gifts were made without any 
obligation on the part of the recipients (Evidence file, 
Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at 66-76). Based upon all of this, 
Appellant was confident that no registration requirements would be 
violated and that the gifts were good faith gifts (Evidence file, 
Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at 70-71). 
Appellant certainly believed that its position was justified 
factually and that there was a good basis for arguing against the 
strained interpretation of "good faith gift1" as stated by the Utah 
Securities Division. It had every reason to believe that it met 
its factual burden of establishing good faith and that the 
Appellee would be reversed at the District Court level. 
Accordingly, there was no basis for the Court of Appeals to 
uphold the District Court's award of sanctions under Rule 11. 
This Court should also grant a Writ of Certiorari relative to this 
issue. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of April, 1992. 
Pfiillip' B.~ Shell—^ 
David H. Day 
Day & Barney 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Capital General Corporation (CGC) appeals the trial court's 
order which affirmed suspension of all secondary stock trading 
exemptions of forty-six corporate entities formed by CGC1 without 
registration pursuant to the Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah 
1. CGC appeared before the Division of Securities to challenge 
the summary order as an "interested11 party under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-14(3) (1989), and on review as a "person aggrieved by a 
final order of the executive director,11 under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-23 (1989). 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1 to -30 (1986), and imposed sanctions under 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm. 
ISSUES 
CGC's brief acknowledges that our decision in Capital Gen. 
Corp. v. Department of Business Reg.. 777 P.2d 494 (Utah App.), 
cert, den., 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989) (hereinafter Amenity), 
regarding the stock of Amenity, Inc. controls certain issues. 
But CGC argues that the following issues require new treatment 
regarding the stock of forty-six other corporations which it 
formed:2 (1) whether the trial court properly applied the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, (2) whether CGC's transfers of 
stock were not sales but good faith gifts exempt from 
registration, (3) whether statutory authority exists for the 
Securities Division to suspend all trading exemptions including 
those of stock transferees, and (4) whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions. 
FACTS 
The parties present this appeal on undisputed facts. The 
Securities Advisory Board adopted the following pertinent 
findings of fact: 
8. H&B Carriers, Inc. was incorporated under 
the laws of the State of Utah on July 1, 
1982. That entity was initially known as Y 
Travel; Jerry W. Peterson and Mr. Yeaman had 
2. The forty-six corporate entities were: H&B Carriers, Inc., 
Florida Growth Industries, Inc., Macaw, Inc., Longhorn 
Enterprise, Inc., Koala Corporation, Yahwe Corporation, Star 
Dolphin, Inc., Jackal, Inc., Hyena Capital, Inc., Gopher Inc., 
Flamingo Capital, Inc., Egret, Inc., Cetacean Industries, Inc., 
Bonito, Inc., Alpaca, Inc., Zeus Enterprise, Inc., Tamarind, 
Inc., Saber, Inc., Radar, Inc., Quiescent, Inc., Vanadium, Inc., 
Upsilon, Inc., Why Not?, Inc., Bestmark, Inc., Missouri Illinois 
Mining, Inc., Dogmatic, Inc., Mystic Industries, Inc., Highland 
Manufacturing, Inc., Kowtow, Inc., Noble Industries, Inc., Oryan 
Capital Corporation, Pegasus Star Enterprise, Inc., Showstoppers, 
Inc., Hightide, Inc., Grandeur, Inc., Fantastic Industries, Inc., 
Jugglar, Inc., Xebec Galleon, Inc., Golden Home Health Care 
Equipment Centers, Inc., Nighthawk Capital, Inc., Resources 
Exploration Data, Inc., Instrument Development Corporation, 
Panther Industries, Inc., Owl Enterprises, Inc., Quail, Inc., and 
GBS Technologies Corporation. 
incorporated Y Travel and the registered 
agent of that entity was Ms, Peterson. 
9. Similar to Amenity, Inc., H&B Carriers, 
Inc. was initially capitalized when Capital 
General Corporation transferred $2,000 to it 
in exchange for authorized common stock. 
Similar to Amenity, Inc., Capital General 
Corporation thereafter gifted, to 
approximately 700 to 1,000 individuals, a 
unit of 100 shares of the stock it had 
acquired. Many of the donees were residents 
of Utah. 
10. None of H&B Carriers, Inc. securities 
were registered with the division at the time 
those securities were gifted. Further, 
neither that corporation nor its securities 
were subject to an exemption from 
registration requirements pursuant to filing 
with the division at that time. 
11. Sparing detail, the December 1, 1987 
Petition sets forth factual allegations 
substantially similar to those identified 
above as to the mode of incorporation, the 
subsequent acquisition and gifting of stock 
in the forty-five (45) other companies under 
review. In each case, the essential 
transaction consisted of the initial transfer 
of securities for a relatively small amount 
of money and the gifting of those securities 
to numerous individuals. In certain 
instances, the gifted securities were 
subsequently traded on the secondary market. 
None of the corporate entities in question or 
the securities which were gifted were 
registered with the division and no 
exemptions from registration requirements 
were ever issued as to those securities. 
Upon petition by the Securities Division, all transactional 
exemptions applicable to the shares of all forty-six Utah 
corporations formed by CGC were ordered suspended by the 
executive director. The order was affirmed by an administrative 
law judge, the Securities Advisory Board, and the lower court. 
CGC had transferred the corporate shares without requesting 
either registration or exemption. CGC asserted that the stock 
transfers were "gifts" and therefore exempt from regulation. 
ANALYSIS 
Our analysis will assume arguendo that Amenity does not 
provide collateral estoppel regarding the issues now presented. 
Here, the Board determined that CGC's transfers of the shares 
were sales within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1986): 
[it] is unlawful for any person to offer or 
sell any security in this state unless it is 
registered under this chapter or the security 
or transaction is exempted under § 61-1-14. 
In Amenity, we held that transfers of Amenity stock under an 
identical scheme were sales and not gifts. The pertinent 
language is the definition of an offer or sale as including a 
"disposition . . . at a security for value." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-13(15)(a) (1986). Value is present even though the 
benefits flow indirectly from the marketplace rather than 
directly from the transterees. Amenity, 777 P.2d at 497. By 
distributing shares, CGC transformed H&B Carriers, Inc. and the 
other forty-five corporations into publicly held corporations 
ripe for acquisition. Thus, the Board's determination that CGC's 
"gifting" program constituted sales for value was reasonable and 
rational. 
CGC claims certain testimony regarding "good faith" 
distinguishes this case trom Amenity. "Good faith gifts" are 
excluded from the detinition of "sale" under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-13(15)(1)(i) (1936). The Board ruled that CGC's transfers 
were not good faith gifts. CGC does not cite us to the record 
nor any precedent other than Amenity. Mr. Yeaman, CGC's 
president, testified regarding his "good faith" efforts not 
mentioned in Amenity. He testified that he talked to two 
attorneys and called the Utah Securities Division regarding gifts 
of stock and was told that the law applied only to sales. On 
direct examination he said, "we called and asked what the 
provisions were for making gifts." On cross-examination he 
stated "as I remember it, it was just a general discussion about 
making gifts and what states' views generally is [sic] about 
gifting stock." Because this evidence is so general, vague and 
uncorroborated, it has little weight or relevance. As in 
Amenity, the Board found that CGC's main intent, based on what 
was actually done with the stock, was to circumvent the statutory 
registration requirements, not to make gifts for the sake of 
generosity. Further, evidence of economic self-interest in 
promoting the same corporate stock scheme as a regular practice 
belies gratuity and innocence. Accordingly, the Board's 
conclusion that the stock transfers were not good faith gifts was 
reasonable and rational. 
CGC's final challenge to the order is that the Securities 
Division did not have statutory authority to issue the summary 
order. The order stated that "pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
61-1-14(2), all transactional exemptions that are applicable, or 
may hereafter become applicable, are suspended." The Board 
concluded that "the distribution of the securities in question 
constitutes the unregistered sale of a security violative of 
Section 61-1-7." 
Subsection (1) of 61-1-14 describes the securities which are 
exempted from sections 61-1-7 (registration before sale) and 61-
1-15 (filing of sales literature). Subsection (2) of 61-1-14 
describes the transactions which are exempted from the same 
requirements. Subsection (3) empowers the division by order to 
"deny or revoke" exemptions with respect to "a specific security, 
transaction or series of transactions" and sets forth the 
hearings procedure which was followed in this matter. Thus, 
because neither registration or exemption were in place, the 
transactions in these specific securities were unlawful. 
Section 61-1-7, registration before sale, provides: "It is 
unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this 
state unless it is registered under this chapter or the security 
or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14." Since CGC had 
not registered the stock and could not claim any exemption, the 
transactions were violative of section 61-1-7. Section 61-1-20 
authorizes enforcement action by the Securities Division. 
"Whenever it appears to the division that any person has engaged, 
is engaging, or is about to engage in any act or practice 
constituting a violation of this chapter or any rule or order 
under this chapter," it may issue a show cause order to cease and 
desist or bring a court action for relief. See Utah Code Ann 
§ 61-1-20(1)(a)-(d) (1986). The summary order stated: 
The entry of an order is in the public 
interest because the offer or sale of 
securities, which have not been registered 
and are not the subject of an appropriate 
underlying exemption from registration, 
deprives investors of the statutory 
protections afforded by the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. 
Thus, as in Amenity, the Securities Division had statutory 
power to act and substantially complied with the statutory 
procedure. See Amenity, 777 P.2d at 498. 
The Securities Division filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions 
consisting solely of attorney fees. The trial court entered an 
award of $1,395.00. We review the award under an abuse of 
discretion standard. We have reviewed the trial court's action 
and cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 
making the award. See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 
(Utah App. 1989). 
Accordingly, we affirm on all issues. 
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ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 910196-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing, filed February 25, 1992, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this £: day of March, 1992. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mary «iT / Noonan 
ClerkVbf the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of March, 1992, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail to each of the 
parties listed below: 
David H. Day 
Phillip B. Shell 
Day & Barney 
Attorneys at Law 
4 5 East Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
R. Paul Van Dam 
State Attorney General 
David N. Sonnenreich 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING was hand-delivered to the trial judge of 
record listed below: 
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon. 
Utah Court of Appeals Judge 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Dated this 9th day of March, 1992. 
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Deputy Clerk 7 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the following 
Issuers, their Securities, 
Affiliates or Successors, 
and/or Entities subsequently ; 
organized by them, including ' 
H & B CARRIERS, INC., et al. ] 
CAPITAL GENERAL CORPORATION, ; 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION AND 




| Case No. 885900053MI 
Judge LEONARD H. RUSSON 
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Rule 11 
Sanctions came on for hearing at 10:00 a.m. on August 13, 1990. 
The petitioner was represented by David H. Day of the law firm of 
Day & Barney, and the defendants were represented by David N. 
Sonnenreich of the Utah Attorney General's Office. After 
reviewing the file and hearing the arguments of counsel, this 
Court issued a Ruling on August 14, 1990. This Order follows. 
ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT: 
1. The petitioner's Petition for Review is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice, the petitioner's claims therein having been 
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and 
2. The petitioner, Capital General Corporation, and its 
counsel, David H. Day and Phillip B. Shell of the law firm of Day 
and Barney, are hereby sanctioned for violating Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and are hereby ordered, jointly 
and severally, to pay to the Office of the Attorney General of 
the State of Utah the sum of $1395.00, representing reasonable 
attorneys' fees.y 
SO ORDEREDTOIS ^P^^DkY OF v J ^ / ^ W , 1990. 
By The Court 
Honoraol e Led 
trict Court Judge 
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BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Cfr THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the following issuers, their : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
securities, affiliates or successors, and/or entities : AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
subsequently organized by them, including: : Case No. SD-87-09-28-01 
H & B Carriers, Inc., et. al. 
Appearances: 
William B. McKean for the Division of Securities 
David H. Day for Capital General Corporation 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
The instant proceeding was initiated pursuant to the issuance of a Petition, dated December 1,1987. By 
Order, also dated December 1,1987, the division suspended all transactional exemptions applicable, or which may 
subsequently become applicable, as to the registration of the securities at issue. Capital General Corporation 
thereafter requested that the matter be set for hearing. 
Pursuant to notice duly served by certified mail, this matter came on regularly for hearing on January 20, 
1988 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Business Regulation. Thereafter, 
evidence was offered and received. 
The administrative law judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and recommended order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Capital General Corporation was incorporated under the laws of the Slate of Utah on March 9,1971. 
David R. Yeaman and Jeri Pettersson are the directors of Capital General Corporation and respectively hold the offices 
of president and vice president. Ms. Pettersson is the registered agent of Capital General Corporation. 
2. At various times during 1986, Capital General Corporation incorporated approximately forty-six (46) 
companies and caused them to go public by distributing their securities through gifts to approximately 700 to 1,000 
individuals with whom Capital General Corporation had been associated. The distribution was typically made to 
donees derived from a list of approximately 1,500 individuals, of whom 450 were residents of this state. 
3. The first company gifted by Capital General Corporation was Elkin Weiss & Co., Inc. Elkin Weiss & 
Co., Inc. was incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah on January 7,1986. At the time of incorporation, 
Elkin Weiss & Co., Inc. was named Amenity, Inc. Julie Harmon, Cynthia Paskett and Ms. Pettersson were the 
incorporators and directors of Amenity, Inc. Ms. Pettersson was the registered agent for Amenity, Inc. 
4. Amenity, Inc. was initially capitalized when Capital General Corporation' transferred S2,000 to it in 
exchange for one million shares of its' authorized common stock, which represented approximately 1% of all 
outstanding common stock authorized. Thereafter, Capital General Corporation gifted, to approximately 700 to 
1,000 individuals, a unit of one hundred (100) shares of the stock it had acquired. None of those securities were 
registered with the division when they were gifted to such individuals. 
5. On June 5,1986, the division initiated an administrative action to suspend trading of Amenity, Inc. 
securities because those securities had been gifted and such gifts allegedly violated the registration provisions of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act. On July 9,1986, four million shares of Amenity, Inc. were purchased by Elkin Weiss 
and Co., Inc. for 525,000. At that time, Elkin Weiss & Co., Inc. was a California corporation . Thereafter, 
Amenity, Inc. changed its name to Elkin Weiss and Co., Inc. 
6. On September 25,1986 and January 20,1987, hearings were conducted in the just-referenced 
administrative proceeding as to Amenity, Inc. On February 18,1987, the Securities Advisory Board and the 
Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation issued an order suspending the use of all secondary 
trading exemptions relative to Amenity, Inc. securities on the basis that the public distribution effected by the gifting 
of those securities was made to evade and circumvent the disclosure required by registration and could not qualify 
under the ngood faith gift" exception contained in Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i). 
7. On April 16,1987, Amenity, Inc. filed a petition in district court seeking review of the just-described 
order. Commencing September 11,1987, Warren Brown Securities Company, Inc., a Utah broker/dealer, Greentree 
Securities, Inc., a Rorida broker/dealer, and Dillon Securities, Inc., a Washington State broker/dealer made markets in 
Elkin Weiss & Co., Inc. securities and have continued to do so. On September 18,1987, the order previously 
entered by the Securities Advisory Board and the Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation was 
upheld on review by the district court. That matter is presently pending before the Utah Court of Appeals. 
8. Respondent H&B Caniers, Inc. was incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah on 
July 1,1982. That entity was initially known as Y Travel. Jerry W. Peterson and Mr. Yeaman had incorporated Y 
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Travel and the registered agent of that entity was Ms. Pettersson. 
9. Similar to Amenity, Inc., H&B Carriers, Inc. was initially capitalized when Capital General Corporation 
transferred $2,000 to it in exchange for authorized common stock. Similar to Amenity, Inc., Capital General 
Corporation thereafter gifted, to approximately 700 to 1,000 individuals, a unit of 100 shares of the stock it had 
acquired. Many of the donees were residents of Utah. 
10. None of H&B Carriers, Inc. securities were registered with the division at the time those securities were 
gifted. Further, neither that corporation nor its securities were subject to an exemption from registration 
requirements pursuant to filing with the division at that time. 
11. Sparing detail, the December 1,1987 Petition sets forth factual allegations substantially similar to those 
identified above as to the mode of incorporation, the subsequent acquisition and gifting of stock in the forty-five (45) 
other companies under review. In each case, the essential transaction consisted of the initial transfer of securities for 
a relatively small amount of money and the gifting of those securities to numerous individuals. In certain instances, 
the gifted securities were subsequently traded on the secondary market None of the corporate entities in question or 
the securities which were gifted were registered with the division and no exemptions from registration requirements 
were ever issued as to those securities. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The division initially asserts that no basis exists to vacate the December 1,1987 Order as to any of the 
corporate entities not represented in the instant proceeding. The division concedes that Capital General Corporation 
is an interested party which has standing to challenge that order, but contends that none of the named companies in 
the December 1,1987 Petition have requested a hearing as to the validity of the order. Given the foregoing, the 
division asserts there is no basis to grant those companies relief from the continued operation of that order. 
The division next contends that the December 1,1987 Order should be summarily affirmed, inasmuch as the 
facts presented herein are similar to those upon which an order suspending the use of secondary trading exemptions 
was previously entered in the case of Amentiv. Inc. (Case No. SD-86-11). To reinterate, the division asserts that the 
gifting of securities constituted the disposition of those securities for value and there is no exemption which exists to 
otherwise obviate compliance with registration requirements. 
Section 61-1-14(3), Utah Code .Ann. (1953), as amended, provides: 
Upon the entry of a summary order, the division shall promptly notify all interested 
parties that it has been entered and of the reasons therefor and that within 15 business days of 
the receipt of a written request, the matter will be set down for hearing . . . . If a hearing is 
requested or ordered, upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities 
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interested parties, may affirm, modify, or vacate tne order . . . . (Jbmpnasis aaaec;. 
Inasmuch as Capital General Corporadon is eidier the sole owner or holds majority control of die various companies 
under review, that affiliation renders Capital General Corporation as an interested party for purposes of this 
proceeding. It necessarily follows that Capital General Corporation may challenge the validity of the summary order 
which was issued and, if that order were to be vacated, the order would be of no further force and effect as to any of 
the companies in question. 
Capital General Corporation urges that the sale of a security refers to a purchase consisting of an exchange of 
a security for money and necessarily excludes the gifting of a security where no such monetary exchange occurs. 
Alternatively, Capital General Corporation asserts that a good faith gift was made in each instance and, thus, any 
such transaction was excluded from compliance with registration requirements. Specifically, Capital General 
Corporation contends that it made inquiry of the division whether the gifting of unregistered securities was 
permissible. Thus, Capital General Corporation asserts tiiat it has desired to comply with the law at all times. 
Finally, Capital General Corporation urges that the protections afforded by registration through the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act relate only to those individuals who have parted with money and, significandy, there is no evidence 
that any individuals have been damaged by reason of the unregistered status of the securities at issue. 
Section 61-1-7 provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it is 
registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14. 
Section 6i-l-13(15)(a) defines "sale" or "sell" to include: 
. . . ever>' contract for sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest 
in a security for value. 
"Offer" and "offer to sell" are defined in Section 61-l-13(15)(b) to include: 
. . . every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security 
or interest in a security for value. 
Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i) further provides that the above-defined terms do not include a "good faith" gift. 
In Technomedical Labs. Inc. v. Utah Securities Division. 744 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated as follows: 
The purposes of securities acts in general are to prevent fraud and to encourage 
disclosure of information through registration, thereby protecting investors from the sale of 
fraudulent and worthless speculative securities. Id at 322. 
The Court further quoted die following language from Payable Accounting Corp. v. McKinlev. Utah, 667 P.2d 15 
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(1983), to wit: 
Securities laws are remedial in nature and should be broadly and liberally construed to 
give effect to the legislative purpose. Id at 17-18. 
There are two pivotal issues in the instant case. The first is whether the gifting of stock represents the 
disposition of a security for value within the meaning of the above-quoted statutes. It is instructive that, in 
Technomedical Labs Inc. v. Utah Securities Division, supra, the Court noted two cases in which the issue addressed 
was whether the distribution of a subsidiary's unregistered shares as a dividend to the parent company's shareholders 
constituted a "sale" requiring registration under the Federal Securities Act of 1933. In its review of Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Datronics Engineers. Inc.. 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Hanvvn Industries Corp.. 326 F.Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the Court summarized the rationale of 
those cases as follows: 
Whether a "sale" has occurred depended upon whether the distribution was "for 
value". Both courts held value would be gained by the creation of a public market... Such 
value includes: (1) an enhanced ability to borrow; (2) an enhanced ability to raise equity; 
(3) the availability of a method of valuing assets; (4) an enhanced liquidity of assets; and 
(5) the prestige associated with publicly held companies. Id. at 324. 
The Court further noted the Department's conclusion that the term uvalue", as defined in the above-cited cases, was 
substantially synonymous with the term "benefit" which was the language under review in Technomedical Labs Inc. 
v. Utah Securities Division, supra. Significantly, the Court concluded that the Department's interpretation of the Act 
and its rulings "fall within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Id. at 325. 
What constitutes "value", as identified by the decisions quoted herein, parallels the meaning of "value" bet 
forth in Sections 61-l-13(15)(a) and (b). As was true in Amenitv. Inc.. the transactions under review in the instant 
case involved the creation and/or maintenance of good will and the resulting beneficial exposure of Capital General 
Corporation's business in various areas. Such represents the value envisioned by the just-cited statutes. 
Importantly, the gifting of securities in each of the transactions under review facilitated the creation of a public 
market for those securities. As Mr. Yeaman stated in an October 2,1987 letter issued by Capital General 
Corporation to the donees of the gifted securities: 
During 1986, you received shares of stock from Capital General as gifts for your 
past association and loyalty to us. It was our intention to use these gifts as a way of 
benefitting you economically and at the same time helping private individuals, corporations, 
etc. to "go public" and increase and enhance the value of the gifts. 
Clearly, the gifting of those securities constituted a disposition for value and the sale of a security, as defined in 
Section 61-M3(15)(a). 
5 
The only remaining issue is whether the disposition of the securities represented a "good faith gift" exempted 
from compliance with the registration requirements set forth in Section 61-1-7 by reason of the applicability of 
Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i). As was true in Amenity. Inc., the division again asserts that the transfer of the securities 
from Capital General Corporation to the donees constitutes a subterfuge designed to avoid registration requirements 
mandated by statute and/or rule, the implication being that the transfer was not one made in "good faith". In 
Amenity. Inc.. it was noted that there was no exemption or exception which had been demonstrated to exist relative 
to the distribution of securities in that case and that no registration of those securities had been sought or granted. 
Concededly, the term "{good faith gift" is not defined by statute. However, Capital General Corporation's 




could be gifted without being registered is misplaced. The question of intent, relative to whether a "good faith gift" \ 
exists, is one which necessarily involves examination of not only whether the issuer subjectively desires to comply 
• * — — . — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
with registration requirements, but whether the absence of compliance and the operative results of the distribution are 
such as to effectively obtain the benefits of a public market in securities absent the protection which registration 
would offer to prospectrveTnvestors of the gifted securities. 
^^AYith£uu_doubt^^^ securities do not constitute that class of potential investors who may 
be in need of information which would be available if the securities were registered. Having invested nothing when 
they were given the securities, the donees are simply conduits through whom the unregistered securities could be 
subsequently purchased by third parties. As Mr. Yeaman noted in his October 2,1987 letter, most of the donees of 
the gifted securities "have made at least some significant paper profits by our program." 
However, it is the creation of a secondary trading market for those securities which then prompts the 
requirement that information be made available through registration for review by those prospective investors who 
may contemplate the purchase of securities which could be potentially worthless. Further, the fact that those who 
have purchased the unregistered securities have not yet suffered financial loss should not operate to compel the 
division to blithely await that possibility. The salutary purposes served by diligent enforcement of securities laws 
and the protection made available to the investing public through registration compels the conclusion that the mere 
potential for damage is a sufficient basis upon which to prevent the trading of unregistered securities. 
In summary, the nature of the transactions under review establishes that the "good faith gift" provision set 
forth in Section 61-l-13(l5)(d)(i) does not apply in the instant case. Thus, the distribution of the securities in 
question constitutes the unregistered sale of a security violative of Section 61-1-7. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the December 1,1987 Order is affirmed. 
Dated this day of April, 1988. 
i. Steven Eklund 
(Administrative Law Judge 
BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order is hereby accepted, 
confirmed, and approved by the Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation. 
Dated this .day of April, 1988. 
William E. Dunn, Executive Director 
BY THE SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD: 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order is hereby accepted, 
confirmed, and approved by the Utah Securities Advisory Board. 
Dated this V^ day of April, 1988. 
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61-1-7 SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
\ i 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities Law practice: what activities of stock or se-
Regulation — State §§ 19 to 24. curity broker constitute unauthorized practice 
C.J.S. — 53 CJ.S. Licenses §§ 74, 77; 79 of law, 34 A.L.R.3d 1305. 
C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regulation §§ 223 to Mistake: effect, as between stockbroker and 
226. customer, of broker's mistaken sale of stock or 
A.L.R. — Churning: stockbroker's liability other security other than that intended by cus-
for allegedly "churning" or engaging cus- tomer, 48 A.L.R.3d 513. 
tomer's account in excessive activity, 32 Key Numbers. — Licenses <s=> I8V2 (38), 38; 
A.L.R.3d 635. Securities Regulation <s=> 270, 274, 277. 
61-1-7. Registration before, sale. 
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless 
it is registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is exempted 
under § 61-1-14. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-7, enacted by L. ment deleted "or to offer to purchase in connec-
1963, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1979, ch. 218, § 2; 1983, tion with a takeover" after "sell"; and substi-
ch. 284, § 10. tuted "chapter" for "act." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Purpose of corporation. of registration of securities. State ex rel. Sec. 
Motives and purposes set forth in bylaws but Comm'n v. Lake Hills, 14 Utah 2d 14, 376 P.2d 
not found in the articles of incorporation could 540 (1962)(decided under former law.) 
not be considered in determining the question 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Utah Take-Over amounts to participation by corporate officer or 
Offer Disclosure Act: Constitutional and Prac- agent in illegal issuance of security in order to 
tical Considerations, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 583. impose liability upon him under state securi-
Utah Legislative Survey — 1979, 1980 Utah ties regulations, 44 A.L.R.3d 588. 
L. Rev. 155. Attorney's preparation of legal document in-
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities cident to sale of securities as rendering him 
Regulation — State § 25 et seq. liable under state securities regulation stat-
C.J.S. — 53 C.J.S. Licenses §§ 75, 76; 79 utes, 62 A.L.R.3d 252. 
C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regulation § 195. Key Numbers. — Licenses «=» I8V2 (35); Se-
A.L.R. — Corporate officer or agent: what curities Regulation «» 247. 
61-1-8. Registration by notification. 
(1) The following securities may be registered by notification, whether or 
not they are also eligible for registration by co-ordination under § 61-1-9: 
(a) any security whose issuer and any predecessors have been in con-
tinuous operation for at least five years if there has been no default 
during the current fiscal year or within the three preceding fiscal years in 
the payment of principal, interest, or dividends on any security of the 
issuer, or any predecessor, with a fixed maturity or a fixed interest or 
dividend provision, and the issuer and any predecessors during the past 
three fiscal years have had average net earnings, determined in accor-
dance with generally accepted accounting practices, (i) which are apphca-
under the provisions of the trust or other agreement 
or instrument under which the security is issued. 
(d) With respect to an equipment trust certifi-
cate, a conditional sales contract, or similar securi-
ties serving the same purpose, "issuer" means the 
person by whom the equipment or property is to be 
used. 
(e) With respect to interests in partnerships, 
general or limited, "issuer" means the partnership 
itself and not the general partner or partners. 
(f) With respect to certificates of interest or 
participation in oil, gas, or mining titles or leases or 
in payment out of production under the titles or 
leases, "issuer" means the owner of the title or lease 
or right of production, whether whole or fractional, 
who creates fractional interests therein for the 
purpose of sale. 
(12) "Nonissuer" means not directly or indirectly 
for the benefit of the issuer. 
(13) "Person" means an individual, a corporation, 
a ' partnership, an association, a joint-stock 
company, a joint venture, a trust where the interests 
of the beneficiaries are evidenced by a security, an 
unincorporated organization, a government, or a 
political subdivision of a government. 
(14) "Promoter" means any person who, acting 
alone or in concert with one or more persons, takes 
initiative in founding or organizing the business or 
enterprise of a person. 
^f(15Ka) "pale* or "sell" includes every contract for 
sate of* contract to sell, or disposition of, a security 
or uitcrat in a security for value. 
iV*u(b) "Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every 
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an 
dffer to buy, a security or interest in a security for 
value. 
J&VT (c) The following are examples of the definit-
ions in subsections (a) and (b): 
c; (i) Any security given or delivered with or as 
a^  bonus on account of any purchase of a security or 
any other thing, is part of the subject of the purc-
hase, and has been offered and soldiouqjue. 
r I (ii) A purported gift of assessableslock is an 
offer or sale as is each assfefancm-tcvifed on the 
stock; ^ i 
; « i (iii) An offer or sale of a security that is 
convertible into, or entitles its holder to acquire or 
subscribe to another security of thesam^or another 
issuer is an offer or sale of that security; and also 
an offer of the other security, whether the right to 
convert or acquire is exercisable immediately or in 
the future. 
*-? (iv) Any conversion or exchange of one* sec-
urity for another shall constitute an offer or sale of 
the security received in a conversion or exchange, 
and the offer to buy or the purchase of the security 
converted or exchanged* 
(v) Securities distributed as a
 r dividend 
wherein the person receiving the dividend surrenders 
the right, or the alternative right, to receive- a cash 
or property dividend is an offer or sale. -< 
(vi) A dividend of a security of another issuer 
is an offer or sale. 
-' (vii) The issuance of a security under a 
merger, consolidation, reorganization, recapitaliza-
tion, reclassification, or acquisition of assets shall 
constitute the offer or sale of the security issued as 
well as the offer to buy or the purchase of any sec-
UU UUL m u u u w . 
(i> A good faith giftr 
(ii) A transfer by death; 
(iii) A transfer by termination of a trust or of 
a beneficial interest in a trust; 
(iv) A security dividend not within clauses 
(cXv)or(vi); 
(v) A securities split or reverse split; or 
(vi) Any act incident to a judicially approved 
reorganization in which a security is issued in exch-
ange for one or more outstanding securities, claims, 
or property interests, or partly in such exchange and 
partly for cash. 
(16) "Securities Act of 1933," "Securities Exch-
ange Act of 1934," "Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935," and "Investment Company 
Act of 1940" mean the federal statutes of those 
names as amended before or after the effective date 
of this chapter. 
(17) "Security" means any note; stock; treasury 
stock; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; 
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement; collateral-trust certificate; 
preorganization certificate or subscription; transfe-
rable share; investment contract; burial certificate or 
burial contract; voting-trust certificate; certificate 
of deposit for a security; certificate of interest of 
participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease 
or in payments out of production under such a title 
or lease; or, in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate 
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant 
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing. "Security" does not include any insurance 
or endowment policy or annuity contract under 
which an insurance company promises to pay money 
in a lump sum or periodically for life or some other 
specified period. 
(18) "State" means any state, territory, or posse-
ssion of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
and Puerto Rico. 1*3 
61-1-14. Exemptions. 
./ (1) The following securities are exempted from 
Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15: 
(a) any security, including a revenue obligation, 
issued or guaranteed by the United States, any state, 
any political subdivision, of a state, or any agency or 
corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of 
the foregoing, or any certificate of deposit for any 
of the foregoing; 
(b) any security issued or guaranteed by 
Canada, any Canadian province, any political sub-
division of any such province, any agency or corp-
orate or other instrumentality of one or more of the 
foregoing, or any other foreign government with 
which the United States currently maintains diplo-
matic relations, if the security is recognized as a 
•valid obligation by the issuer or guarantor; 
(c) any security issued by and representing an 
interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any bank 
organized under the laws of the United States, oi 
any bank, savings institution, or trust company 
supervised under the laws of any state; 
(d) any security issued by and representing at 
interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, an] 
federal savings and loan association, or any buildinj 
and loan or similar association organized under th< 
A V U V t *** VI **%*»» 
loan association, or similar association organized 
and supervised under the laws of this state; 
(0 any security issued or guaranteed by any 
railroad, other common carrier, public utility, or 
holding company which is subject to the jurisdiction 
of the interstate commerce commission; a registered 
holding company under the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935 or a subsidiary of such a 
company within the meaning of that act; regulated 
in respect of its rates or in its issuance by a gover-
nmental authority of the United States, any state, 
Canada, or any Canadian province; 
(g) any security listed on the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
System, the New York Stock Exchange, the Amer-
ican Stock Exchange, or on any other stock exch-
ange or medium approved by the division, provided 
that the division may at any time suspend or revoke 
this exemption for any particular stock exchange, 
medium, security,, or securities under Subsection 61-
1-14(3); any other security of the same issuer 
which is of senior or substantially equal rank to any 
security so listed and approved by the division; any 
security called for by subscription rights or warrants 
so listed or approved; or any warrant or right to 
purchase or subscribe to any of the foregoing; 
r- (h) any security issued by any person organized 
land operated not for private profit but exclusively J 
for religious, educational, ^benevolent, charitable; 
fraternal, social, athletic, or reformatory purposes, 
or as a chamber of commerce or trade or professi-
onal association; and any security issued by a cor-
poration organized under Chapter 1, Title 3 and any 
security issued by a corporation to which the prov-
isions of such chapter are made applicable by com-
pliance with the requirements of Section 3-1-21;. 
l~ (i) any commercial paper which arises out of a 
current transaction or the proceeds of which have 
been or are to be used for current transactions, and 
which evidences an obligation ta pay cash within 
nine months of the date, of issuance, exclusive of 
days of grace, or any, renewal, guarantee, or guar-
antee of renewal, of .the paper which, is likewise 
Bnuted* " . . . . 
r ~ - 0) any investment contract issued in connection 
twith an employees9-' stock purchase, savings, 
pension, profit-sharing, or similar benefit plan;. 
fjMfc flr} affY c*nirity n? trr "• u:iu Mr^'Hrm hy r l f 
or gpw K~A~ »i—^ y ^ ^ ^ p ,»c ;^ t necessary or 
^ ( ? ) The following transactions are exempted from 
jgwions 61-1-7 and 61-1-15:^ .. 
* \ ( a ) any isolated transaction, whether effected 
•rough a broker-dealer or not; 
>l**'(b) any nonissuer transaction in an outstanding 
| * * * y if: (i) it is listed in a recognized securities 
r " ^ such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's 
*«**rities manuals where the listing contains the 
of the issuer's officers and directors, a 
- sheet of the issuer as of a date within 18 
** and a profit and loss statement for either 
*
cal year preceding that date or the most recent 
J * operations; or (ii) the security has a fixed 
/_ or a fixed interest or dividend provision 
there has been no default during the current 
!***r or within the three preceding fiscal years, 
^ ^ i l h c existence of the issuer and any prede-
(c) any nonissuer transaction effected by or 
through a registered broker-dealer pursuant to an 
unsolicited order or offer to buy; 
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other 
person on whose behalf the offering is made and an 
underwriter, or among underwriters; 
(e) any transaction in a bond or other evidence 
of indebtedness secured by a real or chattel mort-
gage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the 
sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage, 
deed of trust, or agreement, together with all the 
bonds or other evidences of indebtedness secured 
thereby, is. offered and sold as a unit; 
(f) any transaction by an executor, administr-
ator, sheriff, marshal, receiver, trustee in bankru-
ptcy, guardian, or conservator; 
(g) any transaction executed by a bona fide 
pledgee without any purpose of evading this 
chapter; 
(h) any offer or sale to a bank, savings institu-
tion, trust company, insurance company, investment 
company as defined in the Investment Company Act 
of 1940, pension or profit-sharing trust, or other 
financial institution or institutional buyer, or to a 
broker-dealer, whether the purchaser is acting for 
itself or in some fiduciary capacity; 
(i) any offer or sale of a preorganization certi-
ficate or subscription if: (i) no commission or other 
remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly 
for soliciting any prospective subscriber; (ii) the 
number of subscribers acquiring any legal or bene-
ficial interest therein does not exceed ten; and (iii) 
there is no general advertising or solicitation in 
connection with the offer or sale; ^ \ ^ 
0X0 any transaction pursuant to an offer by an ^ 
issuer of its securities to its existing securities 
holders, if no commission or other remuneration, 
other than a standby commission is paid or given 
directly or indirectly for soliciting any security 
holders in this state, if the transaction constitutes: 
(AJ the conversion of convertible securities; (B) the 
exercise of nontransferable rights or warrants; (Q 
the exercise of transferable rights or warrants if the 
rights, or warrants are exercisable not more than 90 
days after their issuance; or (D) the purchase of 
securities under a preemptive right; 1 
> ^ - (ii) .the exemption created by Subsection I 
OXjXO » n ° * available* for an offer or sale of sec- \ 
unties to existing securities holders who have acqu- \ 
ired then* securities from the issuer in a transaction \ 
in violation of Section 61-1-7; -^^—) 
s >" (k) any offer, but not a sale, of a security for 
which registration statements have been filed under j 
both this chapter and the Securities Act of 1933 if j 
no stop order or refusal order is in effect and no I 
public proceeding or examination looking toward j 
such an order is pending; 
' 0) a distribution of securities as a dividend if 
the person distributing the dividend is the issuer of 
thesecurities-distributed; 
" ** (m) 'any nonissuer transaction effected by or 
through* a registered broker-dealer where the 
broker-dealer or issuer files with the division, and 
the* broker-dealer maintains in his records, and 
makes reasonably available upon request to any 
person expressing an interest in a proposed transa-
ction in the security with the broker-dealer infor-
mation nr^erihed bv the division under its rules; 
Utah Condominium Ownership Act, wnetner or nut 
to be sold by installment contract, if the provisions 
of the Utah Condominium Ownership Act, or if the 
units are located in another state, the condominium 
act of that state, the Utah Uniform Land and Tim-
eshare Sales Practices Act, and the Utah Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code are complied with; 
(p) any transaction or series of transactions 
involving a merger, consolidation, reorganization, 
recapitalization, reclassification, or sale of assets, if 
the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is 
the issuance of securities of a person or persons, 
and if: 
(i) the transaction or series of transactions is 
incident to a vote of the securities holders of each 
person involved or by written consent or resolution 
of some or all of the securities holders of each 
person involved; 
(ii) the vote, consent, or resolution is given 
under a provision in: (A) the applicable corporate 
statute or other controlling statute; (B) the control-
ling articles of incorporation, trust indenture, deed 
of trust, or partnership agreement; or (C) the cont-
rolling agreement among securities holders; 
(iii)(A) one person involved in the transaction 
is required to file proxy or informational materials 
under Section 14(a) or (c) of the Securities Exchange 
A c t of 1934 or Section 20 of the Investment 
Company Act Of 1940 and has so filed; (B) one 
person involved in the transaction is an insurance 
company which is exempt from filing under Section 
tl2(gX2)(G) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
and has filed proxy or informational materials with 
the appropriate regulatory agency or official of its 
domiciliary state; or ( Q all persons involved in the 
.transaction are exempt from filing under Section 
.|2(gXl) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 
file with the division such proxy or informational 
material as the division requires by rule; 
:< ».- • (iv) the proxy or informational material is 
filed with the division and distributed to all securi-
ties holders entitled to vote in the transaction or 
series Of transactions at least ten business days prior 
to any necessary vote ,by the securities holders or 
action on any necessary consent or resolution; and 
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or 
revoke the exemption within ten business days after 
filing of,the proxy or informational materials; -
> T (q) any transaction as to which the division, by 
rule or order, finds that registration is not necessary 
or appropriate for the protection of investors. 
$X3) Upon approval by the executive director and a 
majority of the Securities Advisory Board, the exe-
cutive director may by order deny or revoke any 
exemption specified in Subsection (l)(h) or (1)0) or 
jta. Subsection (2) with respect to: (a) a specific sec-
urity, transaction, or series of transactions; or (b) 
any person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a 
person or issuer, or any entity subsequently organ-
ized by or on behalf of a person or issuer generally. 
N o such order may be-entered without appropriate 
prior notice to all interested parties, opportunity for 
hearing, and written findings of fact and .conclus-
ions of law,, except that the division may by order 
summarily deny or revoke any of the specified exe-
mptions pending final determination of any proce-
eding under this subsection. Upon the entry of a 
«iimmarv order, the division shall promptly notify 
or division, the order will remain in effect unoi u is 
modified or vacated by the executive director. If a 
hearing is requested or ordered, upon approval by 
the executive director and a majority of the Securi-
ties Advisory Board the executive director, after 
notice of and opportunity for hearing to all intere-
sted persons, may affirm, modify, or vacate the 
order or extend it until final determination. The 
executive director may not extend any summary 
order for more than ten business days. No order 
under this subsection may operate retroactively. No 
person may be considered to have violated Section 
61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any offer or 
sale effected after the entry of an order under this 
subsection if he sustains the burden of proof that he 
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of the order. IOT 
61-1-14.5. Borden of proving exemption. 
In any proceeding under this chapter, civil, crim-
inal, administrative, or judicial, the burden of 
proving an exemption under section 61-1-14 or an 
exception from a definition under section 61-1-13 
is upon the person claiming the exemption or exce-
ption. 1983 
61-1-15. Filing of sales literature. 
The division may by rule or order require the 
filing of any prospectus, pamphlet, circular, form 
letter* advertisement, or other sales literature or 
advertising, communication addressed or intended 
for distribution to prospective investors, unless the 
security or transaction is exempted by section 61-1-. 
14. 1983 
61-1-16. False statements unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person to make or cause to 
be made, in any document filed with the division or 
in any proceeding under this chapter, any statement" 
which is, at the time and in the light of the circum-
stances under which it is made, false or misleading 
in any material respect. - vm 
61-1-17. No finding by division on merits -
Contrary representation unlawful. 
(1) Neither the fact that an application for regis-
tration or a registration statement has been filed nor 
the fact that a person or security is effectively regi-
stered constitutes a finding by the division that any 
document filed under this chapter is true, complete, 
a n d n o t misleading: Neither'any• such-factJior the 
fact that an exemption orex^don^fe^availabk for 
a security or a-transaction means that the division, 
has passed in any way upon the merits or qualific-
ations of, or recommended or given approval to, 
any person, security, or transaction. * "''•' 
(2) It is unlawful to make, or cause to be made, 
to any prospective purchaser, customer, or client 
any representation inconsistent with subsection (1). 
19t3 
61-1-18. Division of securities established -
Director - Appointment • Functions. 
(1) There is established within the department of 
business regulation a. division, of securities. The 
division shall be under the direction and control of a 
director, appointed by the executive director with 
the, governor's,approval. The director shall be res-
ponsible for the administration and enforcement of 
this chapter. The director shall hold office at the 
pleasure of the governor. 
(2) The director, with the approval of the execu-
Hv* director, may employ such staff as necessary to 
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61-1-20. Enforcement action authorized — Bond not re-
quired. 
Whenever it appears to the division that any person has engaged, is engag-
ing, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of this 
chapter or any rule or order under this chapter, it may take the following 
action: 
(1) (a) issue an order directing the person to appear before the division 
and show cause why an order should not be issued directing the 
person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or practice, or 
doing any act in furtherance of the activity; 
(b) the order to show cause shall state the reasons for the order and 
the date of the hearing; 
(c) the division shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show 
cause upon each person named in the order; and 
(d) the division shall hold a hearing on the order to show cause no 
sooner than ten business days after the order is issued. After a hear-
ing, the division may issue an order to cease and desist from engag-
ing in any act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter or 
any rule or order under this chapter. The order shall be accompanied 
by written findings of fact and conclusions of law. If any person 
named in the order to show cause fails to appear at the hearing, then 
an order to cease and desist may be issued against that person. 
(2) bring an action in the appropriate district court of this state or the 
appropriate court of another state to enjoin the acts or practices and to 
enforce compliance with this chapter or any rule or order under this 
chapter. Upon a proper showing the court may: 
(a) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory in-
junction; 
(b) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus; 
(c) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(d) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defen-
dant's assets; 
(e) order disgorgement; 
(f) order rescission; 
(g) impose a fine of not more than $500 for each violation of the 
act; and 
(h) enter any other relief the court considers just. The court may 
not require the division to post a bond. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-20, enacted by L. nated former Subsections (1) through (6) as 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 284, § 29; present Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(f); added 
1986, ch. 107, § 1. Subsection (2)(g); redesignated former Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- tion (7) and the final sentence as present Sub-
ment added Subsections (l)(a) through (l)(d); section (2)(h); and made minor stylistic 
redesignated part of the former introductory changes, 
language as present Subsection (2); redesig-
